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Abstract 
This is an examination of 90 Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) which were generated 
in the London Probation Area between January 2002 and July 2003. The results 
showed that offenders assessed as high risk generated a disproportionately high 
number of SIRs, but equally serious incidents occurred across all risk bands.  
Interpretation of this is not straightforward; despite confirming considerable accuracy 
by Probation staff in identifying those most likely to inflict harm, it also demonstrates 
the limitations of risk prediction, and the need for considerable skill and knowledge 
among staff who work with offenders of all risk bands. Among other findings it 
emerged that nearly a third of alleged offences that triggered SIRs were of rape. 
Lastly, there was a clear contrast in the predictive power of previous convictions: 
over half of those triggering a serious incident report through violent behaviour had 
previous convictions of violence, whereas under a quarter of those accused of a 
sexual offence had previous sexual convictions. Superficially this confirms that past 
violent behaviour is a powerful predictor of future violence, but also reflects the 
considerable gap between offending and conviction for sexual offenders. 
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Introduction 
SIRs have been required since May 1995. Probation Circular 41/1995 requested that 
Probation areas prepare reports for the Home Office on offenders under supervision 
who were charged with murder, other very serious sexual or violent offences, or  “any 
other offence which has attracted or seems likely to attract significant interest, or is 
thought likely to” (Home Office 1995 p2). The motivation for the introduction of such a 
measure was two-fold; firstly to inform the Home Office’s response to media interest, 
and secondly to “identify lessons to be learned at a local and national level or 
shortcomings in practice” (Home Office 1995 p4). A year later PC 79/1996 tightened 
up the process somewhat, for instance by specifically listing all offences to trigger a 
SIR. In March 2004 they became known as Serious Further Offences (SFOs) (Home 
Office 2000).  SIRs require an examination of practice where an offender currently 
being worked with commits, or is alleged to have committed a further serious  
offence. This development is entirely consistent with other developments in the 
Criminal Justice System in general and the Probation Service in particular as it 
makes the protection of the public its paramount task. For some years now Probation 
Officers have become increasingly skilled in assessing offender’s risk of future harm, 
and working within the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) to 
manage that risk.  This has been a considerable success story (National Probation 
Service 2004), although  some commentators have qualified its success by arguing 
that it has promoted a form of “actuarial justice”  and “crime control” (Feeley & 
Simon1992)  at the expense of  rehabilitating offenders  as individuals, and indulged 
the publics sometimes exaggerated fears about the threats dangerous offenders 
pose (Furedi 2001). This study was particularly interested in the “risk principle, 
meaning that the “intensity of intervention should be appropriate to the level of risk” 
(Chapman & Hough 1998 1.27). Up to a point this is an inarguable principle – where 
budgets are finite the services resources must be prioritised, and the risk principle 
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also responds to the demand from the public and legislators that we protect potential 
victims of crime. However, if a great deal of attention goes to a small minority of 
offenders, and if our ability to predict offender’s future offending is limited, then there 
must be a point when this tight targeting of resources becomes counter-productive. 
 
Methods 
Across the whole of the London Probation Area (32 boroughs) there were 90 SIRs 
between January 2002 and July 2003. It is possible that this represents less than 
100% of actual SIRs, as the system relies on watertight communication between 
court staff and supervising staff. A Home Office occasional paper in 2000 concluded 
that around 20% of SIRs went un-noticed or un-reported – not deliberately, but due to 
“oversight or misunderstanding” (Home Office 2000 p16).  
 
The SIRs were examined and data collected as set out in the tables.  Firstly, 
perpetrator characteristics were examined to explore whether there was an under or 
over representation of a certain age group, ethnic group, or particular type of 
order/licence. Next, offence characteristics were examined to see what type of 
offences were triggering SIRs, what levels of risk were the offenders assessed at, 
and what criminogenic factors were featuring in their backgrounds 
 
Results 
Perpetrator Characteristics 
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 The age of those committing the serious incidents 
broadly reflected the age distribution   of offenders 
in general                
 
 
 
SIR perpetrators 
were subject to the 
full range of orders 
and licences.  
Figures exceed 
100% because 
offenders subject to 
a DTTO would also 
be subject to 
another community                                                                                                                               
penalty. When the 
pattern of 
distribution between 
the LPA caseload                 
       and the SIR cohort  was compared using Chi square, the  two sets of figures differed               
significantly,  at the  p<0.001 level. The two groups that stand out from the table are         
those on CPOs, who were under-represented in the SIR cohort, and those on DTTOs, who 
were over-represented in the SIR cohort. 
 
 
AGE OF 
PERPETRATORS 
(SIR cohort) 
% 
  Under 21 11% 
21 – 25 35% 
26 – 35 28% 
36 – 45 18% 
45+ 9% 
Type of Contact LPA caseload 
2003-4 
SIR cohort 
Community Rehabilitation Orders 
(CRO) 
  1898   (27%)  32    (35%) 
Community Punishment and 
Rehabilitation Orders (CPRO) 
     487    (7%)  11    (12%) 
Community Punishment Orders 
(CPO) 
   2170   (31%)    7      (8%) 
Licence    2530   (36%)  40     (44%) 
Drug Treatment and Testing 
Orders (DTTO) 
      492    (7%)  15     (17%) 
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Black offenders do 
seem to be somewhat 
over-represented in the 
SIR cohort, compared 
to the LPA caseload in 
the community for 
2003-4. However the 
picture is distorted by a 
considerable number 
for whom there was no 
race and ethnic 
monitoring data.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Offence/risk characteristics 
    Race London 
Population 
(2001 
census) 
LPA caseload 
(in the  
community, 
 2003-4) 
  SIR Cohort  
Black        10.6%       29.8%      42% 
White        71.2%       40.6%           37% 
Asian        12.1%         4.8%             4% 
mixed          3.16%         4.7%  
Other           2.7%             17%  
Not stated, 
missing 
       19.5%  
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nb these represent charges, not convictions. By 
definition a Serious Incident report involves a 
serious offence, and so it is no surprise that the 
trigger offences span the range of the most grave. 
The high number of rape allegations is striking. 
 
 
The fact that 22% of the 
serious incidents emanated 
from a group of high risk 
offenders comprising only 
4.3% of the LPA caseload 
demonstrates considerable 
accuracy in identifying the 
high risk of harm group. 
Notwithstanding this, the 
majority of serious incidents 
were triggered by offenders 
outside the high  
risk/MAPPA band. When the 
distribution of figures in the 
LPA and the SIR cohort was compared using Chi square, the groups differed significantly, 
where p< 0.001 (Chi square = 82, where df=2)                                                                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                         
           
 
SIR Trigger Offences Nos. 
 Rape 27 
Murder 15 
Possession of Firearms 11 
Kidnap 8 
Attempted Murder 7 
GBH Section 18 5 
Sexual Assaults  5 
Conspiracy to Murder 3 
Armed Robbery 3 
Arson 2 
Aggravated Burglary 2 
GBH Section 20 1 
Affray 1 
RISK STATUS 
(Risk bands 
predate the 4 
OASys bands 
LPA caseload in 
the community, 
2003-4 (14% on 
community 
sentences and 
59% on licences 
not known) 
SIR cohort 
Low Risk 2749 (55.3%) 25 (28%) 
Medium 2002 (40.3%) 45 (49%) 
High/MAPPA 216 (4.3%) 20 (22%) 
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,  
 
A similar pattern is evident here 
– the SIR cohort comprised 
offenders with different  lengths 
of criminal careers 
 
 
 
 
Where the SIR trigger offence was 
a violent offence, perpetrators 
were very likely to have previous 
convictions for violence. The same 
pattern did not emerge for sexual 
offenders. Violent offenders were 
over twice as likely to have similar 
previous convictions as sexual 
offenders. 
 
 
These factors were present in the cohort 
of SIR perpetrators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PERPETRATORS OFFENDING HISTORY 
(SIR cohort) 
Less than 3 previous convictions 17% 
Between 3 – 6 previous 
convictions 
47% 
More than 6 previous convictions 36% 
RELEVANT FACTORS IDENTIFIED 
(SIR cohort) 
Drug use  28%  
Domestic abuse  20% 
Homeless or housing problem 17% 
Alcohol 13% 
Mental health problems 9% 
PREVIOUS SEXUAL AND VIOLENT OFFENCES 
(SIR cohort) 
Sexual offence with previous 
Sex Offender History 
22% 
Sexual Offence with no Sex 
Offender History 
78% 
Violent Offence with previous 
violent offending history 
54% 
Violent offence with no violent 
offending history 
46% 
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Discussion 
 
Offender characteristics 
Age: 74% of the serious incidents were committed by individuals aged 35 and under. 
This is of little surprise, and echoes the trend found in work on criminal careers and 
desistance (eg Farrington 1995) that most people mature out of crime.  
 
Race; When the race of SIR perpetrators was examined.  42% of offenders were 
either Black British or Black Caribbean, 37% white and 4% Asian.  Black offenders 
were therefore somewhat over-represented amongst the perpetrators of Serious 
Incidents, as they comprise 29.8% of the LPA caseload in the community. There 
were however a considerable number in the general caseload, particularly those on 
licence, for whom information was not available. It could be speculated that this over-
representation might reflect the compounding effects of disadvantage and exclusion 
leading to criminality, or a lesser quality of risk management.  An even more startling 
and dismaying disparity is between the black population of London measured in the 
2001 census (10.6%) and their representation in the LPA caseload, even taking into 
account this groups probable under-representation in the census figures.    
 
Type of Order; SIRs were triggered by offenders subject to all types of order and licence.  
When the pattern of distribution between the LPA caseload and the SIR cohort  was 
compared using Chi square, the  two sets of figures differed  significantly,  at the  p<0.001 
level. Two groups in particular stand out from the table. Those on CPOs, were under-
represented in the SIR cohort (just 7, despite a pool in the general caseload of 2170 in the 
year 2003-4). LPA figures for 2003-4 show that the majority of its CPOs, (77%), were in the 
low risk band, with only 0.6% of all CPOs being classified as high risk. The fact that CPOs 
are being reserved for lower risk offenders, who rarely reoffend violently is in itself  evidence 
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of a good degree of accuracy in practitioners risk assessments. Those on DTTOs were 
over-represented in the SIR cohort (15 out of a pool in the general caseload of 492 for the 
year 2003-4), and confirms the need for experienced well trained practitioners to work with 
this group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Offence/risk characteristics 
 
Trigger offences; One astounding phenomena was the large number of alleged 
rapists in the sample. A full 27 out of the 90 serious incidents were triggered by a 
charge of rape. If we compared this with LPA offence breakdown figures for 2003-4, 
the proportion of offenders in the community with index offences of a sexual nature 
hovers just under or over 1% of the total caseload (this would be a little higher if the 
population in custody was taken into account). It is not known how many of the 27 
alleged rapists in this cohort went on to be convicted, and we might speculate that 
only a minority were.  Kelly et al (2005) found the present conviction rate for rape to 
be only 5.6% of all cases brought to Court (compared to 32% in 1977).  Rhys’s 2001 
examination of 88 Inner London Probation Service’s SIRs provides an interesting 
comparison: she found a similarly high number of alleged rapes triggering the SIR 
(23 out of 88) but in her sample she reported that 21 of these actually resulted in 
convictions for rape.  We can only speculate why the conviction rate should be so 
untypically high here – perhaps the perpetrators circumstances meant that the case 
was prosecuted particularly assiduously.  
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There was also a preponderance of alleged murders amongst the serious incidents 
(15 out of 90) although a little less than Rhys’s finding (19 out of 88 convictions)   
Possession of Firearms offences triggered 11 out the 90 SIRs, a finding that reflects 
the increased availability and willingness to use weapons - a clear contrast to Rhys’s 
(2001) study that showed just one conviction out of 88 only four years ago. The 
National Statistics Office (2005) cite a 35% increase in offences involving firearms 
between the years 2000/1 and 2001/2. The upward trend is less straightforward 
when just the firearm offences that resulted in a death are considered. They have 
wavered up and down, with 43 in 1997, peaking at 59 in 2001 and dropping to 35 in 
2003, possibly reflecting the impact of projects such as Operation Trident (a police 
initiative to reduce gun crimes, particularly amongst London’s black communities). 
 
 
Risk status: This was perhaps the most interesting part of the study. In this sample 
22% of the SIRs were from the high risk band, 49% from the medium band, and 28% 
were classified as low risk. However, given that only a small number of cases overall 
are classified as high risk (only 4.3% of all LPA cases in the community in 2003-4) 
this means that those classified as high risk were still around 5 times more likely to 
commit a Serious Incident whilst under supervision than other offenders. An inverse 
pattern was found amongst the low risk offenders; although 51.2% of offenders were 
classified as low risk (LPA figures for 2003-4) they generated only 28% of all SIRs.   
The association between the assessed risk of offenders on the caseload and whether 
they were involved in a serious incident was assessed using Chi square. The risk of 
committing a serious incident was found to be highly related to the assessed risk for 
this population (p<0.001) 
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We are still left with something of a problem in  interpretating this data: if all SIRs had 
emanated from the high risk band, would we conclude that practitioners were very 
good at predicting high risk of harm offenders, or very bad at containing them? Not 
withstanding this conundrum, what is quite clear is that Serious Incident Reports are 
not triggered exclusively, or even predominantly by those assessed as high risk 
offenders.  A similar pattern was revealed when the number of previous convictions 
was considered. Serious incidents were perpetrated by offenders at all stages of their 
offending career. Previous violent convictions did, as we would expect, predict future 
violence fairly well, but there were still 17% of the SIRs generated by offenders with 
less than three previous criminal convictions. A similar pattern was found by Rhys 
(2001), who examined 88 SIRs and found 21 had been classified as high risk, 26 
medium risk and 17 low risk (24 were not known – in itself evidence of a sharpening 
of practice over a short time). 
 
So, we have a concentration of SIRs in the high risk band, but a significant number 
(49%) in the medium risk band which would not have been included in MAPPA.  
These patterns show what has already been stated many times (Kemshall 2003, 
Beaumont 1999), namely that we can achieve a certain degree of accuracy in 
predicting risk of harm, but no more.   The quality of the risk assessments do not 
account for preponderance of SIRs outside the high risk band. It was clear that the 
majority of these cases demonstrated good practice. Just 10% showed some sort of 
weakness and when this was the case, they were not necessarily of the kind to have 
prevented the serious incident from happening.  This data confirms that all of the 
tools available to us (a variety of actuarial instruments and checklist type frameworks, 
the collective wisdom and clinical skills of the practitioners) succeed up to a point in 
sorting those most likely to inflict harm from those less likely to, but there will always 
be a proportion who confound prediction. The most effective of actuarial tools have 
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always made realistic claims about their powers.  For instance, Rice and Harris’s 
1995 Violence Risk Appraisal Guide claims a 75% success rate – one of the highest 
for all actuarial tools. Closer to home, the Offender Group Reconviction Scale claims 
a success rate of 65% (Taylor 1999). This data pre-dates the comprehensive use of 
OASys that exists now, and we can anticipate with some confidence that this will 
improve accuracy and consistency up to a point - and with even more confidence that 
it will produce thorough needs assessments, and a comprehensive database for the 
future.  Nevertheless, serious reoffending whilst under supervision is inevitable, and 
the best efforts of all practitioners will not prevent all such events from occurring. 
 
The rationale behind the risk principle (whereby the organisations resources are 
targeted towards those who present the highest risk) is irresistible – there is the 
tendency for the lower risk offenders to be adversely affected by intensive 
programme style work (McGuire, 1995) and then there are the demands from the 
public, legislature and policy makers that we concentrate limited resources on those 
who may cause harm.. However, to apply this principle to an extreme fails to 
recognise the limitations of our predictive power.  Staff who are not nearly as 
qualified as those working in Public Protection teams are increasingly taking on roles 
in assessing for risk of harm (for instance completing OASys assessments) and will 
be charged with the task of judging whether an offender on supervision may be about 
to commit a  violent act. The proposed structure of the National Offender 
Management Service as of January 2005 very clearly defines four “modalities” of 
offender work which build on each other, and range from least to most interventionist. 
The first of these modalities is called the “punish” modality and the “offender 
management approach” in this modality is to be “hands-off, administrative, 
organising, monitoring, signposting to resources”. Under the heading 
“description/modality” for this modality the requirement to “monitor risk factors” is 
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included. (NOMS 2005, p3) However it all begs this question - will there be enough 
staff time, and time from a practitioner who has had some training on risk to know the 
offender, and notice when his or her circumstances or state of mind change? It is not 
until the fourth modality, which is entitled “control” is reached that any significant risk 
management work is elaborated. The literature on risk management has consistently 
stressed that risk is dynamic (Kemshall & Pritchard 1995) and reflects a shifting 
constellation of factors (Scott 1997). Moreover this study confirms that there are limits 
to accurate prediction. To place a strict demarcation between the parts of the 
organisation that manage risk and those parts that do not is to ignore these axioms. 
 
There are interesting parallels in child protection and mental health work. Eileen 
Munro, considering identical issues in a child protection context wrote in 1999 
“Society…has unrealistic hopes of the feasibility of developing accurate risk 
assessments” (Munro 1999 p117), and she bemoaned the climate where 
practitioners erred on the side of caution and families who did not (yet) breach the 
“significant risk of harm” threshold went unassisted.  Munro and Rumgay (2000) 
examined a number of inquiries into homicides by the mentally ill. Their conclusion 
was that even with the best expertise available, in the majority of the cases (63%) it 
simply would not have been possible to predict those individuals who were about to 
commit murder. The risk assessments were not at fault, but the circumstances did 
not lend themselves to accurate prediction. However, they do argue that had an 
overall level of psychiatric care been delivered across all patients, sufficient to spot 
when a relapse was about to occur, then a good proportion (65%) may have been 
preventable.  . A further commentary on the risk principle is provided by  the 
Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health. In their 2002 inspection of Hackneys mental 
health services  they noted that a full 25% of the budget was being spent on 115 high 
risk patients, to the clear detriment of the service to those with severe problems but 
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posing a lesser risk. They clearly conclude that there comes a point when the 
unavoidable and necessary targeting of resources on to those deemed “the most 
likely to” becomes counter-productive 
 
Turning to the predictive power of previous convictions there were some striking 
results. Previous violent convictions in this cohort predicted future violence well,  in 
contrast to previous sexual offences which did not  as effectively predict future sexual 
offences .Only 22% of SIRs involving sexual offences were committed by someone 
with previous sexual offences, but 54% of the SIRS involving violence were 
committed by an individual with previous convictions for violence. The poor predictive 
power of sexual convictions in part reflects the gap between offending and conviction 
– a difficult measure to quantify, but Craissati (2004) concluded that around one fifth 
of sexual offences are actually reported to the police. 
 
 
 
Criminogenic Factors. 
As would be expected, a range of dynamic, known criminogenic factors were present 
amongst the SIR perpetrators (drug and alcohol misuse, accommodation problems, 
domestic abuse, mental health problems). Some of these are considered in more 
depth below, but as a general point it is interesting to compare this cohort with the 
recent comprehensive review by Harper and Chitty (2005). In their review of factors 
associated with offending they compiled information from OASys assessments 
nationally, and found consistently higher levels of all such problems than in this 
cohort. Whilst this study is clearly not a detailed comparison of this information, what 
does stand out is that the SIR cohort is not a group that is conspicuously and 
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unusually beset by such problems, once again confirming the complex and 
sometimes elusive nature of risk assessment. .  
 
Substance misuse: in this study alcohol misuse featured in 13% of SIRs, and drug 
use 28%. This is something of a contrast to Rhys’s earlier study of SIRs in 2001 
where alcohol featured in 35% and drug use in 27%. Her examination of the details 
of the offences revealed that alcohol use was far more likely to play a part in the 
offence than drugs. The current study unfortunately did not examine the occurrence 
of mental disorder along with substance misuse (“dual diagnosis”). Rhys in 2001 
found that 17 out of the 88 incidents featured both, and moreover that these cases  
presented particular management problems, as frequently neither psychiatric 
services nor services for substance misusers wished to become involved because of 
the dual diagnosis. 
 
Domestic abuse 20%of the SIRs featured domestic abuse. This confirms it as an 
important factor to watch for when managing offenders, but it itself tells us only that 
this cohort of offenders displayed similar prevalence of domestic abuse than in the 
general population – the British Crime Survey noted that 22.7% of women reported 
being a victim of a domestic assault (Mirlees-Black 1999). Perhaps more necessary 
is that practitioners have some depth of knowledge about the subject -  for instance 
the association between pregnancy and particular vulnerability to assault, and the 
peak in vulnerability to attack during the two months after leaving a violent 
relationship (Metropolitan Police 2004).  
 
Mental illness: Only 9% in this sample identified mental disorder as a relevant 
feature. This is much lower than the 28% of Rhys’s sample in her 2001 research. 
There is the possibility that this is a statistical blip in a relatively small sample. The 
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prevalence of mental illness in the general population is usually estimated in the 
region of 16% (Department of Health 1999) and it is unlikely that this sample would 
possess better than average mental health. However, perhaps this is a useful 
reminder of the evidence around mental illness and violence, which could be 
summarised as indicating that there is only a slight elevation of risk for schizophrenia, 
and a modest elevation of risk for psychopathic personality disorder. (Blumenthal & 
Lavender 2000)   Taylor & Gunn (1999) placed this association into perspective by  
noting that the figure of around 40 homicides per year by someone with a current or 
past mental health problem is tiny compared to other types of homicides, suicides or 
accidental death. Moreover it is a statistic that has remained unchanged for several 
decades. They write pertinently that the connection between mental illness and 
violence  is a “small but significant problem…some groups of people with mental 
disorder are at statistically higher risk as a group of being violent to others than the 
general public, but it is vital to understand the size and nature of the risks involved” 
(pp 10).  
 
This is where, from the practitioner’s point of view that a good understanding of the 
individual and their mental illness is needed.  Incorporating actuarial and clinical 
information is a complex skill, which necessarily requires us to negotiate uncertainty 
and contradiction. The significance of psychotic thinking, for instance, is not 
something that can be simplistically used as a feature that should alert us to 
forthcoming violence. Link and Stueve (1994) proposed with a good deal of evidence 
that we should be particularly vigilant when we hear someone displaying 
“threat/control over-ride” thinking – that is perceiving their life or their security 
threatened by someone or something, and moreover that their agency against such a 
threat has been taken away. Nevertheless, the Royal College of Psychiatrists in 
(2000) cited other research as evidence that delusions do not increase risk of 
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violence. Integrating such research findings requires a depth of knowledge and an 
appreciation of the limitations of accurate prediction.  
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
The LPA supervises approximately 30,000 offenders.  Of these, approximately 
20,000 will be in the community on licences and community penalties.  This study 
represents only 0.5% of the caseload at any one time, which even allowing for some 
missing cases, means that 99% of cases supervised reach their conclusion without 
an SIR/SFO.  However the 0.5% that this study looks at is precisely the small slice 
that the public and media are most interested in, and where we potentially attract 
criticism. The most important finding in this study was that practitioners exercise 
considerable accuracy in identifying offenders likely to inflict harm, but the majority of 
such offenders remain outside the high risk, intensively worked with band. The “risk 
principle” makes sense on too many levels to seriously reject it, but when applied too 
rigorously it increases the likelihood that indicators of risk will be missed.  This 
suggests a need for relevant risk training across all grades of staff who work with 
offenders, and the opportunity to develop working relationships beyond the 
perfunctory and procedural. 
 
 
 
Thanks to Geraldine Gavin (LPA) for access to the data and David Wellstead 
(Health Research and Development Support Unit, University of Hertfordshire) 
for statistical advice. 
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